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Herb's Welding v. Gray: "Maritime
Employment" Remains Undefined
I. Introduction
In Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray,1 the Supreme Court de-
cided in a five-to-four decision 2 that a welder injured while
working on a fixed offshore oil and drilling platforms in state
territorial waters4 was not engaged in "maritime employment"5
1. 105 S. Ct. 1421 (1985).
2. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and O'Connor, dissented.
3. One commentator explains that:
Two general classes of structures are used in exploring for and production of oil
and gas from beneath the ocean. One class of structures floats or is capable of
being floated from site to site. Currently, most exploratory drilling occurs on such
structures, which include submersible barges, semi-submersible barges, jack-up
rigs, and drill ships. ... The other class of structures are permanently attached
to the ocean bottom. These artificial islands and fixed platforms are not vessels.
The distinction betweeen vessels and nonvessels is the key to the offshore injury
system.
Robison, Injuries to Marine Petroleum Workers: A Plea for Radical Simplification, 55
TEX. L. REv. 973, 982 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (analyzing the history and law of inju-
ries as applied to petroleum workers).
4. State territorial waters are defined for purposes of the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act as that area within three geographical miles off the
coastline of each state. A worker employed on a rig outside of this limit is working on the
Outer Continental Shelf. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333(b), (c), 1331(a), 1301(a)(2) (1982).
5. Equally important are the different types of workers discussed herein. First, the
workers' compensation schemes discussed in this Note, whether state or federal, have
never been applied to seamen. Seamen are provided separate personal injury remedies in
admiralty under doctrines of maintenance and cure, seaworthiness, and the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1982). The question of who is a seaman has been the subject of much
litigation; however it is generally conceded that a seaman must have some degree of
connection to a vessel. See Offshore Oil Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
Seamen's remedies are considered to be the most munificent in law. See G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 272-484 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE
& BLACK].
This Note does not concern seamen and their remedies. The types of marine work-
ers demanding compensation under either state or federal acts are non-seamen, whose
work is more or less related to maritime commerce. Respondent Gray is seeking the re-
quired work status that permits compensation under the federal Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982). See statutes cited infra
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within the meaning of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act [hereinafter cited as LHWCA].6 Thus, the in-
jured employee was relegated to the less munificent applicable
state workers' compensation scheme.
Part II of this Note examines the background of the
LHWCA in four sections. Section A discusses the state of law
prior to the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927. The period be-
tween the 1927 enactment and the 1972 amendments is dis-
cussed in Section B of Part II. The post-1972 amendment era is
covered in Section C of Part II. Part II concludes with the appli-
cation of the LHWCA to workers employed in the exploration
and recovery of offshore oil. The factual and procedural back-
grounds of the Herb's Welding cases are discussed in Part III of
this Note. Part III also includes a review of the administrative
note 6.
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
Section 903(a) of the Act provides in part:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or
death of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building
a vessel).
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1982).
Section 902(3) of the Act provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,
but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982).
The original Act provided:
Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability or death
of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law.
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424,
1426 (1927), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a) (1982).
The term navigable waters herein refers to that area to which coverage was extended
under the original LHWCA, or its amended version. Under either version, work on board
a ship is considered to be upon navigable waters. See generally Herb's Welding, 105 S.
Ct. at 1430-31 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1429 (1985).
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and appellate decisions, as well as the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court. Part IV analyzes the Court's de-
cision and suggests that the majority has blurred two of the dis-
tinct statutory requirements of the LHWCA. The LHWCA as
amended requires an examination of the situs of the injury and
an examination of the status of the injured employee.8 However,
the majority in Herb's Welding exaggerated the impact of the
injury's situs upon the injured employee's status. Consequently,
the majority did not analyze other characteristics of his employ-
ment indicative of status for purposes of the LHWCA. Part IV
also suggests that the majority's interpretation of the legislative
intent of the LHWCA is unduly restrictive. Parts IV and V con-
clude by suggesting that the Court should have adopted in part
the "realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime
activities"" test for determining whether an employee has status
for purposes of the LHWCA.
II. Background
A. The Pre-LHWCA Period
In 1917, the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jen-
sen,10 declared that states were constitutionally barred from ap-
plying their workmen's compensation systems to shipboard mar-
itime injuries." The Court concluded that the application of
state compensation schemes to shipboard injuries would inter-
fere with the overriding federal policy of a uniform maritime
law. 1 2 Thus, after Jensen, longshoremen who were injured while
8. The situs requirement is set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), restricting LHWCA cov-
erage to designated work locations. The status requirement is set forth in 33 U.S.C. §
902(3). See statutes cited supra note 6.
9. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1983).
10. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
11. Id.
12. Jensen was killed while unloading a ship docked in New York City. His widow
sought compensation under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court
held that:
If New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations as
those imposed by her Compensation Statutes, other States may do likewise. The
necessary consequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to
maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish; and freedom
of navigation between the States and with foreign countries would be seriously
hampered and impeded.
19861
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working aboard ship were left without a compensation remedy
while longshoremen injured while working on a pier were pro-
tected by state compensation acts. 13 Dissatisfied with the gap in
coverage thus created, and recognizing that the amphibious" na-
ture of longshoremen's work made it desirable to have one law
to cover the purview of their entire employment, Congress twice
sought to authorize the states to apply their own compensation
statutes to maritime injuries occurring seaward of the "Jensen"
line.' 6 Its attempts to allow such uniform state systems, how-
ever, were struck down as unlawful delegations of Congressional
power.' 6
Id. at 217. "In Jensen, we held that state compensation Acts could not cover longshore-
men injured seaward of the water's edge. The line of demarcation between land and
water became known as the 'Jensen' line." Director, Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 306 n.14 (1983). Had the injury oc-
curred on the pier, Jensen would have been covered by the State Act.
Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution extends "the judicial power of the United States [to]
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This section
has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
See also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 47 (an exposition on the state-federal
conflicts in admiralty).
13. In State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922), the Court
stated that:
When an employee, working on board a vessel in navigable waters, sustains per-
sonal injuries there, and seeks damages from the employer, the applicable legal
principles are very different from those which would control if he had been in-
jured on land while unloading the vessel. In the former situation the liability of
employer must be determined under the maritime law; in the latter, no general
maritime rule prescribes the liability, and the local law has always been applied.
Id. at 272-73.
14. Longshoremen load and discharge vessels that are usually docked. Their work is
amphibious because its location is divided between a dock, and on board a vessel floating
alongside the dock. The gap referred to was the coverage provided for longshoremen
injured while working on board a vessel, as compared to the coverage provided for long-
shoremen injured on the dock. The former was not covered during the "Jensen" era
under any compensation scheme, the latter was covered under the appropriate state
scheme. See L. KENDALL, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 119-48 (4th ed. 1983).
15. See Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 and Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40
Stat. 395.
16. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), the Court stated that:
And so construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress. Its
power to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction
and remedies for their enforcement, arises from the Constitution, as above indi-
cated. The definite object of the grant was to commit direct control to the Federal
Government; to relieve maritime commerce from unnecessary burdens and disad-
vantages incident to discordant legislation; and to establish, so far as practicable,
harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/5
HERB'S WELDING v. GRAY
At the same time, the Court began to narrow the "Jensen"
doctrine by identifying circumstances in which the subject of the
litigation might be classified as both maritime and "local in
character, 1 7 thus making the subject of litigation amenable to
the state compensation law."8 For example, if the employment of
an injured maritime worker was determined to have no direct
relation to navigation or commerce, and the operation of local
law would not materially affect the uniformity of maritime law,
then the employment would be characterized as "maritime but
local," and the state could provide a compensation remedy.19
This remedy could be provided notwithstanding the injury's
shipboard situs beyond the "Jensen" line. However, if the em-
ployment could not be considered "maritime but local," the
maritime worker injured aboard ship would be without a com-
pensation remedy.20
Convinced that the only way to provide workmen's compen-
sation for longshoremen and harborworkers injured on board
ship21 was to enact a federal compensation scheme, Congress
passed the LHWCA in 1927.2
B. Period Between the Enactment of the LHWCA and the
1972 Amendments
The LHWCA provided, inter alia, compensation for em-
ployee injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States if recovery through workmen's compensation pro-
Id. at 164. See also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
17. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 717 (1980).
18. Id.
19. Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). A carpenter injured while
engaged in construction work aboard a nearly completed vessel lying in navigable waters
was allowed to recover under the state compensation scheme.
[W]e recently pointed out that, as to certain local matters regulation of which
would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the
latter might be modified or supplemented by state statutes. The present case is
controlled by that principle. The statute of the State applies and defines the
rights and liabilities of the parties.
Id. at 477.
20. See Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 253 n.2 (1942) (listing repre-
sentative case law from the "maritime but local" era).
21. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1977).
22. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44
Stat. 1424 (1927), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a) (1982).
1986]
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ceedings could not validly be provided by state law.2 3
The LHWCA thus linked together federal and state law to
provide theoretically complete coverage for maritime laborers.2 4
The LHWCA, however, was only intended to cover those work-
ers not already covered under state acts.25 This included workers
whose injuries occurred aboard ship, but could not be considered
"maritime but local. '2 6 However, the boundary at which state
remedies gave way to federal remedies was difficult to determine
in individual cases. 27 As a result, the injured worker was com-
pelled to make a jurisdictional guess before filing a claim; the
price of error was unnecessary expense and possible foreclosure
from the proper forum because of differing statutes of limita-
23. 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903(a) (1982). See
statutes cited supra note 6.
24. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 718.
25. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 258.
26. Gilmore and Black explain that:
The-'may not validly be provided by state law' limitation in LHCA § 903(a) was
generally-indeed universally-taken to have built the Garcia-Rohde "maritime
but local" category into the Act's coverage. That is, a worker like Rohde not only
could not sue in admiralty; he could not claim federal compensation under the
LHCA either; he was restricted for all purposes to his rights under the relevant
state compensation act. On the other hand, a claim for the injury or death of a
worker like the decedent in Jensen ... could be made only under LHCA, since the
application of a state compensation act to such workers was, per Jensen,
unconstitutional.
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 419.
27. For example, in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d
Cir. 1937) a worker sought LHWCA coverage for an injury sustained while constructing a
lighthouse 12 miles offshore. The LHWCA was held inapplicable, since the employment
pertained to local matters to which State Compensation Law could apply.
Litigation concerning the border between state and federal coverage was extensive.
Those which have held the matters as local, and within state law are: Rosengrant v.
Havard, 273 U.S. 664 (1927), Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926),
Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941). Cases that were not ad-
judged as "maritime but local" therefore, decided under federal law are: Baizley Iron
Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930), Nogueira v. New York, N.H. and H.R.R., 281 U.S.
128 (1930).
The incorporation of the "maritime but local'" doctrine into the original LHWCA is
criticized by Gilmore and Black because:
Only a soothsayer with a crystal ball could tell which claimants were on the state
side of the line ("maritime but local") and which were on the federal side ("mari-
time and national"). For a decade and a half "maritime but local" was one of the
most flourishing, as it was surely depressing, branches of federal jurisprudence.
GILMORE & BLACK supra note 5, at 419-20.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/5
HERB'S WELDING v. GRAY
tions.2 ' The matter was raised before the Supreme Court in Da-
vis v. Department of Labor and Industry.29
In Davis, the decedent was killed while dismantling a bridge
located over navigable waters.30 The decedent had helped to cut
some steel from the bridge and, at the time of the accident, was
working on a barge used for the stowage of cut pieces.3 1 The de-
cedent's representative made a claim under the State Compen-
sation Act. However, the Washington State Supreme Court held
that the state could not, consistent with the federal Constitu-
tion, make an award under its compensation law to the widow of
a workman drowned in a navigable river.12 The state court anal-
ogized his employment to a longshoreman engaged in loading
operations." Therefore, under Jensen, the claim could only be
brought under the LHWCA.34 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and reversed. 35
Justice Black, writing for the majority, recognized the diffi-
culties involved in determining whether the state or federal act
applied,3 6 commenting that "[t]his Court has been unable to
give any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state
power in advance of litigation .. .,,1
Clearly, there is, in the light of the cases referred to, a twi-
light zone in which the employees must have their rights deter-
mined case by case, and in which particular facts and circum-
stances are vital elements. That zone includes persons such as the
decedent who are, as a matter of actual administration, in fact
protected under the state compensation act.38
This "twilight zone" effectively established a regime of concur-
rent state and federal jurisdiction."
28. Davis, 317 U.S. at 254. See Ayres v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936).
29. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
30. Id. at 251.
31. Id.
32. Davis v. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 121 P.2d 365 (1942).
33. Id. at 366.
34. Id.
35. Davis, 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
36. Id. at 253.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 256.
39. Gilmore and Black note about Justice Black that:
[He] did not explain how the majority thought the twilight zone was supposed to
1986]
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Marine-related injuries prior to the 1972 amendments thus
fell within three jursidictional spheres. At the furthest extreme,
the "Jensen" doctrine commanded that maritime injuries upon
the navigable waters of the United States were not compensable
under state workmen's compensation schemes. They were com-
pensable only under the LHWCA.4 e Second, those injuries classi-
fied as "maritime but local" occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States could be compensated either under the
LHWCA or under state compensation laws.41 Third, injuries suf-
fered ashore were compensable only under state laws.42
Thus, before 1972, LHWCA coverage was determined
largely by the traditional "locality" test of maritime tort juris-
diction. If an accident occurred on the navigable waters (which
usually meant on a vessel) the worker was covered under the
LHWCA no matter how close the accident may have been to the
adjoining land or pier.44 In contrast, if an accident occurred on
the adjoining land, pier, or wharf, there was only state coverage,
no matter how close the accident may have been to the water's
edge.46 Thus, it was possible for a longshoreman moving cargo
from ship to pier to be covered concurrently by the LHWCA
and the state act for injuries incurred on board ship. However, a
longshoreman was only covered under the state laws for injuries
incurrred on the pier. A single situs requirement governed the
work, beyond the obvious point that the State of Washington was being directed
to consider and adjudicate the Davis claim even if the decedent had been on the
"Jensen" side of the Supreme Court's line. Both Justice Frankfurter, concurring,
and Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, thought he meant that the claim could have
been brought either under the state act or under LHWCA ....
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 420.
40. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
41. In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), the Court held that the
LHWCA covered all injuries on navigable waters whether or not a particular one was
also within the constitutional reach of a state law. Id. at 124. There has been much post-
Calbeck discussion on whether or not the Calbeck decision abrogated the Davis "twilight
zone". The consensus is that the concurrent jurisdiction established in Davis was not
affected by the Calbeck decision. See GILMORE & BLACK supra note 5, at 421-23.
42. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
43. Under this test, the invocation of admiralty subject matter jurisdiction for mari-
time torts was based solely on the water situs of the tort. This test was changed by the
Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). See
infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
44. Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 105 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (1985).
45. Id.
[Vol. 6:311
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scope of the LHWCA's coverage."6
Behind this system of "checkered coverage''47 was the real-
ity that federal and state workers' compensation schemes usu-
ally had very different benefit levels, with state benefit levels
often being inadequate.48 Thus, those workers whose profes-
sional lives might require that they move back and forth be-
tween water and adjoining land had to rely on an imperfect
amalgam of federal and state workers' compensation law for
workers' compensation benefits. The adequacy of compensation
in any given case was a function of the pure fortuity of a work-
related accident's exact location. 9
C. The 1972 Amendments
In 1972, Congress extended the scope of protection of the
LHWCA landward beyond the shoreline of the navigable waters
of the United States.50 As a result, the Act became a source of
relief for injuries which had always been the province of state
compensation law. 1 The amended LHWCA broadened the defi-
nition of "navigable waters of the United States" to include
"any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an
employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.
'12
At the same time, Congress amended the definition of per-
sons covered by the Act to include "any person engaged in mari-
time employment, including any longshoreman or other person
engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker ...
."3 Expanding the situs landward would not only have brought
uniform coverage to those occupations previously covered in
part, it would also have brought within the covered situs large
46. Id.
47. Id. The coverage was "checkered" because longshoremen moved continuously in
and out of the two statutory schemes. In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S.
212 (1969), Justice Douglas protested the incongruity and unfairness of having coverage
determined by "where the body falls." Id. at 225 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1430.
49. Id.
50. See Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 719 (for a discussion of the extended protection).
51. Id.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1982).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982). See statutes cited supra note 6.
1986]
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numbers of occupations whose members had never before been
covered at all.54 With the definition of "navigable waters" ex-
panded by 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) to include such a large geographi-
cal area, it became necessary to describe specifically the class of
workers compensable.8 5 Congress therefore added the status re-
quirement of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). s Congress adopted a status test
in order to exclude workers on the newly expanded situs not
compensable under the LHWCA. The amendments thus
changed what had been essentially only a situs test of eligibil-
ity57 to one contemplating both the situs of the injury and the
status of the injured.5 s
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments provides in
part that:
The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation
system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by
this Act for part of their activity .... The Committee does not
intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, un-
loading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are in-
jured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such
activity.59
54. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For example,
would a truck driver injured while working on a dock (a covered situs under the
amended act) enjoy LHWCA coverage?
55. Id.
56. See statutes cited supra note 6. Whether or not Gray had status pursuant to §
902(3) was the focal issue in the Herb's Welding cases.
57. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
58. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1431 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4698, 4708. The legislative history devoted two pages to the amendments'
extension of LHWCA coverage to shoreside areas, the situs and status tests. These two
pages are minimal when compared to the full 22 pages of legislative history. H.R. REP.
No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698,
4707-08. The Supreme Court in Caputo stated that the newly extended scope of coverage
of the LHWCA was not the main concern of the amendments. The predominant concern
was the accomodation of three interested groups. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 261. First, ship-
owners who were discontent with the decisions allowing many maritime workers to use
the doctrine of "seaworthiness" to recover full damages from shipowners regardless of
fault in addition to coverage under the LHWCA. Id. A number of Supreme Court deci-
sions, starting with Seas Shipping v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), had made it possible
for an injured longshoreman to avail himself of the benefits of the LHWCA, and to sue
the owner of the ship on which he was working for damages as a result of this injury. The
longshoreman's suit, based on the doctrine of seaworthiness, and normally accorded to
seamen only, was essentially one of strict liability. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/5
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The 1972 amendments provided compensation for maritime
workers, as defined by 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), injured while em-
ployed on a covered situs, as defined by 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).60 In
order to recover under the LHWCA, an employee must satisfy
these two statutory tests.
D. LHWCA - Application to Offshore Drilling
Prior to 1953, all claims for injuries on fixed oil drilling plat-
forms proceeded under state workers' compensation schemes.1
The 1953 passage of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act6 2
[hereinafter cited as Lands Act] extended LHWCA coverage to
workers injured on fixed rigs which were located outside of state
territorial waters.63 However, workers injured on fixed platforms
362 U.S. 539 (1960) (historical development and application of the seaworthiness doc-
trine). The 1972 amendments have eliminated this action for longshoremen. See H.R.
REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698,
4701-03.
Second, the amendments fulfilled the desires of employers of longshoremen who
could be required to indemnify owners of ships held liable in an unseaworthiness strict
liability action. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 261. The result of this was, in effect, a double indem-
nity paid by the longshoreman's employer to the injured employee. See Ryan Stevedor-
ing Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). See also H.R. REP. No.
1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4702.
Third, the amendments fulfilled desires of workers who wanted to improve the
LHWCA benefit schedule. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 261. See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4700.
60. See statutes cited supra note 6.
61. Robison, supra note 3, at 993.
62. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) reads as follows:
With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury oc-
curring as the result of operations conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the
natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil or
seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable under the
provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
Id.
The purpose of the Lands Act was to define a body of law applicable to the seabed,
the subsoil, and the fixed structures of the Outer Continental Shelf. In addition to pro-
viding for application of the LHWCA for injuries to workers resulting from operations
conducted on the shelf, the Lands Act provides for the application of state law as surro-
gate federal law when not inconsistent with applicable federal law. See generally P.
SWAN, OCEAN OIL AND GAs DRILLING 305-10 (1979).
This is set forth in 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) which provides that:
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter
or with other Federal laws ... the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State..
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within three miles of the shore continued to look to state work-
men's compensation as their primary source of reparation for
work related injuries."
State coverage for injuries aboard fixed platforms within the
three mile limit continued after enactment of the Lands Act for
two reasons. First, as noted, the Lands Act did not provide for
LHWCA coverage for injuries on state territorial waters. 5 Sec-
ond, fixed rigs had been adjudged as artificial islands outside the
scope of the LHWCA.66 Fixed platforms were not considered
"actual navigable waters" under the original LHWCA. 7 Thus,
injuries occurring on fixed platforms within three miles of shore
were not compensable under the LHWCA by its own force, nor
by virtue of the Lands Act. Injured workers were left to recover
under state schemes.
The artificial island concept was established in a series of
cases. 58 In Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,69 two oil
rig workers died from injuries which were sustained on fixed
drilling platforms located outside of Louisiana territorial wa-
ters.7 0 Each man's family brought suit for wrongful death in the
federal courts both under the Death on the High Seas Act 71
are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and
seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the Outer margin of the Outer Continental Shelf....
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1982).
In Smith v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1975), the court held the
LHWCA to be the exclusive remedy for an employee injured on a fixed platform on the
Outer Continental Shelf, precluding the application of Louisiana Workmen's
compensation.
64. In Freeman v. Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1975), compensation for
an injury occurring 2.9 miles offshore was adjudged according to state compensation law.
65. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Injuries occurring on the Outer
Continental Shelf would be compensable under the LHWCA by virtue of the Lands Act.
66. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
67. See Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1425. Fixed platforms are also generally con-
sidered outside the scope of the situs requirement of the LHWCA as amended. See infra
note 180 and accompanying text.
68. See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352 (1969); Bertrand v. Shell Oil Co., 489 F.2d 293, 295
(5th Cir. 1974); Callahan v. Flouor Ocean Servs., 482 F.2d 1350, 1351 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
70. Id.
71. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). 46 U.S.C. § 761 reads in relevant
part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
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[hereinafter Seas Act] and under Louisiana law72 which was as-
sertedly made applicable by the Lands Act.73 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit,74 affirming the district court'5 held
that the Seas Act provided the exclusive remedy for these
deaths.7 6 Petitioners sought certiorari, arguing that the Lands
Act entitled them to additional remedies provided by state law
adopted as surrogate federal law."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in light of the
principles of traditional admiralty law, petitioners' remedies
were found exclusively under the Lands Act and Louisiana law.7 8
The Court ruled that fixed rigs were "artificial islands" similar
to federal enclaves in an upland state.7  The Court opined that
"Admiralty jurisdiction has not been construed to extend to ac-
cidents on piers, jetties, bridges, or even ramps or railways run-
ning into the sea."80 Drilling platforms have "no more connec-
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State .... the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district court of the United States, in admiralty ....
Id.
72. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1985).
73. Claimant argued that the Lousiana statute was in part applicable because Loui-
siana law, when not inconsistent with federal law, was to be applied on the Outer Shelf
as surrogate federal law. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 352-53. The argument was based on the
Lands Act provision at 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Claimant was not arguing for exclusive application of state law. Claimant argued
that unlike the state compensation act, the Seas Act makes no provision for non-pecuni-
ary damages. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 353. Therefore, the awarding of non-pecuniary dam-
ages according to state law was not inconsistent with federal law. In short, claimant
wanted damages provided by both statutes. Under Louisiana law, recovery may be had
for loss of support, society, pain and suffering, and companionship. LA. CM. CODE ANN.
art. 2315 (West Supp. 1985).
74. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Dore v.
Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968).
75. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 266 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. La. 1967).
76. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968); Dore v.
Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1968).
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b). See supra note 63.
78. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. at 355. "Since the Seas Act
does not apply of its own force under admiralty principles .... Louisiana law is not
ousted by the Seas Act, and under the Lands Act it is made applicable. Id.
"The [Seas Act] redresses only those deaths stemming from wrongful actions or
omissions 'occurring on the high seas,' and these cases involve a series of events on artifi-
cial islands." Id. at 359.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Id. at 360. Extension of LHWCA coverage to piers under the 1972 amendments,
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tion with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on
piers."81 Thus, under these circumstances, the Lands Act made
it clear that federal law, supplemented by state law of the adja-
cent state, was to be applied to these islands.82
Although Rodrigue did not concern the LHWCA, its "artifi-
cial island" concept has important ramifications. The concept ef-
fectively denies 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) situs to injured workers
aboard these islands, the result of which precludes LHWCA
compensation. 83 Therefore, a worker injured aboard a fixed plat-
form within three miles of the shore has traditionally been de-
nied compensation under the LHWCA;84 his only remedy is
under state law. However, a worker injured aboard a fixed plat-
form on the Outer Shelf may recover under the LHWCA, by vir-
tue of its application through the Lands Act.85 This is so not-
withstanding the absence of the required situs.
Floating drill structures have been treated as vessels by the
lower courts.8 6 Workers on them enjoy LHWCA compensation
similar to workers injured aboard ship.87 However, if a worker
can prove that he is permanently attached to the vessel as a
crewmember, he is entitled to seamen's remedies in accordance
with maritime law.88
33 U.S.C. § 903(a), arguably extends LHWCA coverage to drilling platforms. See Herb's
Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1983). See also supra note 67 and infra
note 180.
81. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 360.
82. See supra note 63.
83. In Herb's Welding, the Court continued the treatment of fixed platforms as arti-
ficial islands. "[Tihe platforms involved were artificial islands and were to be treated as
though they were federal enclaves in an upland State." Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at
1426. However, the majority did not treat the platforms as islands for purposes of §
903(a). The majority determined that the welder was not engaged in maritime employ-
ment because he was injured on an artificial island. Id. at 1422-29. See infra note 180
and notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
84. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1425.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1333(b). See supra note 63.
86. Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976) (jack-up-rigs);
Howard v. Global Marine, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 809, 105 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1973) (drill ship);
Adams v. Kelly Drilling Co., 273 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845
(1960) (submersible barge).
87. See Robison, supra note 3 at 982-92 (a discussion on compensation for floating
rig workers).
88. See Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transp., Inc., 369 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1966) (employees who are more or less permanently attached to floating rigs are seamen).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussion on seamen's remedies).
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In review, the compensation for injured rig workers has de-
veloped into a tripartite system that depends upon the type and
location of the rig upon which the injury occurs. First, if a rig
worker is injured aboard a fixed platform within three miles, his
remedy is state compensation only. The rig is deemed an "artifi-
cial island" lacking LHWCA situs s9 If his injury occurs on a
fixed platform on the Outer Shelf (outside the three mile limit),
he is entitled to compensation under the LHWCA by virtue of
the Lands Act.90 Third, a worker employed on board a floating
rig is covered by the LHWCA irrespective of the rig's location
because'the rig is considered to be a vessel upon navigable wa-
ters,"1 unless the worker can show the requisite nexus to the
floating rig, thereby qualifying as a seaman entitled to the more
munificent remedies accorded seamen by law.92
III. Herb's Welding v. Gray
A. Facts
Gray worked for Herb's Welding, Inc., in the Bay Marchand
oil and gas field off the Louisiana coast.93 Herb's Welding pro-
vided welding services to the owners of drilling platforms.94 The
field was located partly in Louisiana territorial waters and partly
on the Outer Contintental Shelf.9 Gray spent roughly three-
quarters of his working time on platforms in state waters and
the rest on platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf.9a He
worked exclusively as a welder, building and replacing pipelines
and doing general maintenance work on the platforms.9 7
On July 11, 1975, Gray was welding a gas flow line on a
fixed platform" located in Louisiana waters.99 He burned
89. See Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1425.
90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 105 S. Ct. 1421, 1423 (1985).
94. Id.
95. Id. The line of demarcation between Louisiana state territorial waters and the
Outer Continental Shelf is three miles offshore. See supra note 4.
96. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1423.
97. Id. at 1423-24.
98. Id. at 1424. See supra note 3.
99. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1425. The fact that Gray's work situs at the time
19861
15
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:311
bottom of the line creating an explosion. Gray ran from the area,
and in doing so was injured.1"'
B. Administrative Decisions
Gray sought benefits under the LHWCA for lost wages, dis-
ability, and medical expenses.10' When compensation was denied
by the compensation carrier for Herb's Welding, Gray filed a
complaint with the Department of Labor.10 2 An administrative
law judge'03 refused the LHWCA claim finding that Gray was
not involved in maritime employment, and therefore did not sat-
isfy the LHWCA's status requirement.0
The Benefits Review Board reversed the administrative law
judge's finding, concluding that, irrespective of the nature of his
employment, Gray could recover by virtue of the Lands Act,'05
which grants LHWCA benefits to offshore oil workers injured on
the Outer Continental Shelf.'0 6 Although Gray had been injured
in state waters, and not upon the Shelf, the Board opined that
his injury nonetheless could be said to have occurred, in the
words of the Lands Act, "as a result of" operations on the
Shelf.107 Petitioners sought review in the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 08
of his injury was in state territorial waters is significant because the provisions of the
Lands Act that extends LHWCA coverage to injured rig workers does not apply. See
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
100. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1424.
101. Id. The types of compensation available under the LHWCA are found gener-
ally at 33 U.S.C. §§ 906-910 (1982).
102. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1424. The Secretary of Labor administers the
LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(6) (1982).
103. Hearings conducted in determination of LHWCA coverage are before an ad-
ministrative law judge. See 33 U.S.C. § 919(d) (1982).
104. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1424.
105. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1983). The case was re-
manded to an administrative law judge who awarded $10,000 and deducted the $3000
awarded under the State law. Id. Appeals from an administrative law judge's decision are
brought before the Benefits Review Board. See 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1982).
106. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
107. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1424.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982) provides that "[any person adversely affected or ag-
grieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . I..." Id.
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C. The Appellate Decision
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Benefits Review Board's
finding that Gray was covered by the LHWCA.109 However, the
court declined to make this finding by virtue of the Lands Act.
The court ruled that Gray was covered by virtue of the LHWCA
alone.1 10
Gray's employment aboard a fixed platform in territorial
waters was held to be within a covered situs. The court held this
notwithstanding the Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
ruling that fixed platforms were "artificial islands" to be treated
like federal enclaves in an upland state."' The court noted that
Rodrigue was a pre-amendment decision,112 and reasoned that at
the time it was written the LHWCA provided coverage only for
injuries occurring upon navigable waters.11 Thus, those injuries
occurring upon piers, wharves, or wharf-like structures were ex-
cluded from the LHWCA's coverage.1 ' However, by virtue of
the 1972 amendments, LHWCA coverage was extended to pro-
vide compensation for certain employees who were injured in ac-
cidents upon piers and wharves. 1 5 The jurisprudential concept
of an island implies that there is an island's shore, and the func-
tion of a fixed platform can be analogized to a wharf projecting
from that shore.116 In a word, the function of a fixed platform is
109. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983).
110. Id. at 181.
111. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). See supra notes
69-85 and accompanying text (Rodrigue's impact on LHWCA coverage for injuries sus-
tained on board drilling platforms). The Rodrigue Court determined that the Death on
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. I 1983), did not apply to wrong-
ful death actions brought by families of men killed upon fixed platforms on the Outer
Continental Shelf. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 359-66. Justice White wrote that traditional
admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to these platforms. He likened them to wharves
located above navigable waters. Id.
112. Herb's Welding, 703 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. The original LHWCA required the injury to have occurred on the actual
,.navigable waters of the United States." Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927), amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3),
903(a) (1982). As noted, workers on board a vessel lying alongside a dock were considered
to be on actual "navigable waters." See statutes cited supra note 6.
114. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Rodrigue, 395
U.S. 352).
115. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1983). See 33 U.S.C. §§
902(3), 903(a) (1982). See also statutes cited supra note 6.
116. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1983).
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precisely that of a wharf over navigable waters,' 17 a situs which
is now covered by the LHWCA as amended.
The finding that fixed platform workers in territorial waters
are within a covered LHWCA situs did not end the court's in-
quiry into Gray's case. The status test of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) re-
quires that the worker be an employee engaged in maritime em-
ployment." 8 A claim under the LHWCA can be successfully
maintained only when both statutory tests are satisfied.
The court ruled that Gray was clearly employed in maritime
employment." 9 The test used in this analysis was whether the
work bore "a realistically significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity.' °2 0 In finding this relationship, the purpose of
the work was the central inquiry, not the particular skills of the
worker.'
The court reviewed the overall nature of Gray's work, and
noted that offshore drilling - the discovery, recovery, and sale
of oil and natural gas from the sea bottom - had been ad-
judged to be maritime commerce. 2 2 Because Gray's welding
work was a central part of that process, it obviously facilitated
maritime commerce.12 3 Therefore, both status and situs tests
having been fulfilled, the order of the Benefits Review Board
was affirmed. 24
D. The Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Cir-
cuit, declaring that Gray was not engaged in maritime employ-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 179. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (a discussion on the
development of the status test, as required by 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982)).
119. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 179.
121. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Trotti &
Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1221 n.16 (5th Cir. 1980)). The "significant rela-
tionship" test has been used frequently by appellate courts when adjudging LHWCA
status. For other cases using this test see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
122. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1983). In Pippen v. Shell
Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981), the court accepted offshore drilling and production
of oil as maritime commerce for purposes of determining employee status. Id. at 385.
123. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1983).
124. Id.
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ment, and therefore did not satisfy the status requirement of the
LHWCA. s5 The Court expressed no determination as to Gray's
injury situs. 12
The majority framed its opinion around four arguments.
First, the legislature never intended that the 1972 amendments
reach Gray's occupation.12 The Court noted that there was
never any reference to oil rigs in the legislative history of the
1972 shoreside extension of the LHWCA. 128 Congress' concern
was to extend coverage to workers on piers, docks, and other
areas used to load, unload, build, or repair ships.2 9
Second, the Fifth Circuit's expansive view of maritime em-
ployment was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent con-
struing the 1972 amendments.3 0 "Congress did not seek to cover
all those who breathe salt air,"'' but only those within the
newly created status line of demarcation.
The Court referred to Northeast Marine Terminal v.
Caputo, 32 a Supreme Court decision purporting to define the
scope of maritime status. In Caputo, one claimant fell and was
injured while employed as a checker on a cargo dock with a ves-
sel alongside,3 3 and the other claimant was injured while work-
125. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1423 (1985).
126. Id. at 1429. The majority's declaration as to the non-reaching of situs is dubi-
ous. For the suggestion that the Court mistakenly blurred the two separate provisions,
exaggerating the impact of Gray's situs in its determination that he was not engaged in
maritime employment, see infra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
127. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1425-26.
128. Id.
129. Id. The majority was specifically referring to the legislative history providing
that:
[tihe Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in load-
ing, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an
area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose re-
sponsibility is only to pick up stored cargo'for further trans-shipment would not
be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to
participate in the loading or unloading of cargo.
H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4698, 4708. For more detailed analysis of the legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ments, see supra note 59.
130. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1421-27 (citing Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977)).
131. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1427.
132. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
133. Id. at 253. A checker is responsible for checking and recording cargo as it is
loaded or unloaded from vessels, barges, or containers. Id. at 252-53.
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ing a dolly loaded with cargo into a pierside truck.'" In Caputo,
the Court held that both claimants had maritime status. The
Court noted that the status question was difficult due to con-
gressional failure to define the relevant terms - maritime em-
ployment, longshoremen, longshoring operations - in either
the LHWCA or its legislative history. 135 The Court recognized
that the purpose of the LHWCA was to protect those workers on
the situs who are involved in the essential elements of loading
and unloading a vessel.13 6 It is "clear that persons who are on
the situs but not engaged in the overall process of loading and
unloading vessels are not covered. 1 37 Since the claimants in
Caputo were involved in activities that were "clearly an integral
part of the unloading process,"138 they were within LHWCA sta-
tus. Since claimant Gray was not involved in the overall loading
and unloading process of vessels, the majority ruled that he
could not be engaged in maritime employment for purposes of
the LHWCA. 189
Third, any alleged "checkered coverage"140 arising from the
exclusion of fixed rig workers in state waters from LHWCA cov-
erage was due to Congress' explicit geographical limitation of the
Lands Act.14 1 If Gray was employed on the Outer Continental
Shelf, he would be entitled to compensation under the LHWCA
134. Id. at 253. Caputo focused on the status issue. The situs requirement was ful-
filled because claimants were working on a dock, a covered situs under the amended
LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1982).
135. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 265.
136. Id. at 266-67.
137. Id. at 267.
138. Id. at 271. The Court was specifically impressed with the House Committee
Report's detailed use of checkers as an example of those involved in the loading and
unloading functions covered by the 1972 amendments. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4698, 4708.
139. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1427-28. "We have never read 'maritime employ-
ment' to extend so far beyond those actually involved in moving cargo between ship and
land transportation." Id. at 1428. For suggestions that Gray's work was more intimately
related to the movement of cargo than the Herb's Welding Court presumed, see infra
notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
140. Herb's Welding, 105 S.Ct. at 1429. Respondents argued that denying coverage
to someone in Gray's position results in the inconsistent checkered coverage that Con-
gress sought to eliminate in 1972. Id.
141. Id. "[Tihat statute draws a clear geographical boundary that will predictably
result in workers moving in and out of coverage." Id.
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by virtue of the Lands Act.142 However, he would still not tech-
nically be deemed a maritime employee for purposes of the
LHWCA."3s Any discrepancies or gaps in coverage were for the
legislature to fill.""'
Lastly, the Court reasoned that the Rodrigue 1 5 decision,
coupled with the legislative history of the Lands Act, supported
the non-maritime nature of fixed oil drilling platforms.1 46 In Ro-
drigue, the Court limited the worker's remedy to the Lands Act
and to borrowed state law, not admiralty law, indicating that
drilling platforms were not even suggestive of traditional mari-
time activity.147 Likewise, the legislative history of the Lands
Act would be entirely inconsistent with a holding that offshore
drilling is a maritime activity and that any task essential thereto
is maritime employment for purposes of LHWCA. 141 Congress
interpreted the Lands Act to mean that maritime law could not
be applied to fixed platforms, and considered this when formu-
lating the 1972 status requirement. 49 Consequently, fixed rig
workers, like Gray, are foreclosed from asserting maritime
status.
2. The Dissent
The dissent concluded that Gray's employment satisfied the
status test.150 The status issue was first addressed in light of the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments. The minority argued
that the amendments were designed to eliminate those aspects
of the prior system that made coverage "depend upon 'fortuitous
circumstances' of whether the injury occurred on land or over
water."' 15 ' Because workers injured on board floating drill rigs
142. Id. 33 U.S.C. § 1333(b) extends LHWCA coverage to all workers on the Outer
Shelf. See supra note 63.
143. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1429.
144. Id.
145. 395 U.S. 352 (1969). See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
146. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1426-27.
147. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 360-61.
148. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1426.
149. Id. at 1426-27.
150. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1441. The dissent also determined that Gray was
injured on a covered situs, an issue the majority did not address. Id. See also supra
note 126 and accompanying text.
151. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1431. The dissent was referring to the following
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were covered by the LHWCA, 52 there was no reason for Con-
gress to leave a gap in coverage when the work performed
aboard fixed platforms is substantially the same as work per-
formed aboard floating drill rigs. 153 The dissent reasoned that
Congress intended to rationalize coverage through an occupa-
tional test and would not have wanted to treat these workers as
belonging to two different occupations, one maritime, and the
other non-maritime.'"
The dissent also argued that the majority's interpretation of
Caputo should be analyzed as defining occupational status as it
applies to aspects of longshoring only. 55 The dissent argued that
Caputo should be limited to its facts, because its doctrine was
never meant to reach the type of employment in Herb's Weld-
ing.15 6 Thus, Caputo "did not purport to limit the [LHWCA's]
coverage to that particular setting, nor did [it] try to define any
precise limits for the occupational status test outside that
setting.' ' 5 7
The dissent was influenced by Director, Office of Worker's
Compensation Program v. Perini North River Associates, ' 5  a
1983 Supreme Court decision, in which the Court held that a
construction worker injured while working on a barge during the
construction of a riverside sewage treatment plant was engaged
in maritime employment.15 9 The dissent viewed the Perini anal-
ysis of the status test as highly relevant.60 First, the Court in
Perini refused to rest its holding on any application of a "direct"
or "substantial relation" test to navigation or traditional notions
of commerce.' 6 ' The Perini Court held that the 1972 Congress
legislative history: "The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a long-
shoreman or ship repairman or builder should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance
of whether the injury occurred on land or over water." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4708.
152. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
153. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1430.
154. Id. at 1438.
155. Id. at 1436-37. For a discussion on the majority's interpretation of Caputo, see
supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
156. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1437.
157. id.
158. 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
159. Id. at 299-300.
160. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1437.
161. Perini, 459 U.S. at 318-19. The Director of the Office of Workers' Compensa-
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did not mean to incorporate such an inquiry into the analysis of
occupational status. 162 The dissent in Herb's Welding did not
utilize this test to determine status. However, it deemed Perini
significant in that the Perini Court saw location as an important
factor in defining status. 163 In Perini, the fact that a worker was
required to work over the actual navigable waters was weighty
evidence of his or her status. 64 Location is significant princi-
pally because an occupation's location is an aspect of the occu-
pation's status.' 65 Because Gray's employment involved ocean
travel and extended periods of time over and adjacent to the
water, the inclusion of fixed rig workers within the maritime em-
ployment classification is appropriate.'66 This was especially true
in light of a rig worker's overwhelmingly maritime situs com-
pared to a longshoreman's virtual shoreside workplace. 6 7 The
dissent would therefore permit an inquiry into the substantial
situs underpinnings of a claimant's status. The fact that Gray's
work was sea-based could not be trivialized in making a determi-
nation of his employment status. 6s
Lastly, the dissent was disconcerted with the majority's reli-
ance on Rodrigue and expressed a viewpoint consistent with that
of the Fifth Circuit in Herb's Welding.'69 Rodrigue was a pre-
amendment approach perceiving oil platforms as having "no
more connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do
accidents on piers." 170 This was acceptable under pre-1972 ju-
risprudence; however, extension of the LHWCA to piers and
tion, as petitioner, argued that Perini could not have LHWCA status if his work did not
have a "substantial relation" to navigation or commerce. The Court ruled that in the
case of an employee injured while working on navigable waters, no such relation is re-
quired. Id. See infra notes 218-222 and accompanying text.
The "substantial relation" test was used by the Fifth Circuit in determining that
Gray was engaged in maritime employment. Herb's Welding, 703 F.2d at 179.
162. Perini, 459 U.S. at 318-19.
163. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1437.
164. Id. at 1439 (citing Perini, 459 U.S. at 323-24).
165. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1437.
166. Id. at 1439.
167. "Unlike typical land based workers, they would spend virtually their entire
work lives within the statutes covered maritime situs - that is, either on or immedi-
ately adjacent to the actual navigable waters." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1432-33. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
170. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1432 (citing Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 360).
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wharves through 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)17 1 makes platforms the stuff
of admiralty that Rodrigue excluded. 17
Concluding, the dissent determined that Gray satisfied the
status and situs requirements of the LHWCA.17 3
IV. Analysis
The first section of this analysis criticizes the majority opin-
ion because it exaggerated the impact of the "artificial island"
situs in its determination that Gray was not engaged in mari-
time employment. Consequently, the majority summarily ad-
dressed other characteristics of Gray's employment. This has
important ramifications. First, it provides minimal guidance for
lower tribunals charged with administering LHWCA claims. Sec-
ond, it is in derogation of evolving maritime law.
The second section of this analysis criticizes the majority
opinion because its interpretation of the legislative intent of 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) is unduly restrictive.
The third section of this analysis suggests that the Supreme
Court should have adopted in part the "realistically significant
relationship to traditional maritime activities" 17' test as a
method of determining whether an employee injured on real or
artificial land is engaged in maritime employment for purposes
of the LHWCA.
A. Statutory Blur - Confused Seas and the Return of
Locality
The LHWCA as amended requires separate assessments of
a claimant's status and situs. 175 However, the majority opinion
exaggerates the impact of Gray's "artificial island" situs in its
determination that Gray was not engaged in maritime
employment. 7
6
171. See statutes cited supra note 6.
172. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1433.
173. Id. at 1441.
174. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra text ac-
companying notes 120-21.
175. See statutes cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
176. Gray's claim for compensation was denied because he failed to satisfy the sta-
tus requirement of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982). See supra notes 125-49 and accompanying
text. The majority did not reach the issue of whether Gray was injured on a covered
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For example, the majority overemphasizes the importance
of the Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. decision. 177 Ro-
drigue was a pre-amendment decision that precluded an action
from being heard in admiralty due to the "artificial island" con-
cept, clearly pre-1972 amendment law that directed its primary
inquiry into the situs of an injury.'7 8
The majority's concern that, according to Rodrigue, "drill-
ing platforms were not even suggestive of traditional maritime
affairs "179 is ironic because the Court using the Rodrigue reason-
ing could have denied Gray's claim by virtue of 33 U.S.C. §
903(a), without referring to attributes of Gray's employment.' a0
Rodrigue speaks primarily to situs, not status. Rodrigue as ap-
plied to 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) merely begs the issue.
Similarly, the majority's interpretation of the Lands Act is
not dispositive of whether Gray was engaged in maritime em-
ployment.' 8 ' The Lands Act is a 1953 statute that merely carved
situs. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. 1421, 1429 (1985).
177. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. The majority reasoned that
since Gray was injured on an artificial island, he could not have been engaged in mari-
time employment. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1426-27.
178. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). See supra notes
69-85 and accompanying text. Rodrigue was decided when only location upon "navigable
waters" was required for LHWCA coverage. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
179. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1426 (1985).
180. See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352 (discussed supra notes 69-85 and accompanying
text). Whether the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA extended coverage to fixed plat-
forms within state territorial waters is arguable. The Fifth Circuit in Herb's Welding
held that the 1972 amendments extended coverage to these platforms because they can
be analogized to piers and wharves, covered situs under the amended LHWCA. Herb's
Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra text accompanying
notes 115-17.
The dissent in Herb's Welding agreed with the Fifth Circuit. Herb's Welding, 105 S.
Ct. at 1441. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
Robison cites post-1972 administrative decisions holding that work on fixed plat-
forms meets the new situs requirement of the amended LHWCA. Robison, supra note 3,
at 994 n.146.
Why the majority chose to deny Gray's claim because of his occupational status is
unclear. Perhaps it indicates that the traditional treatment of platforms as artificial is-
lands outside the scope of maritime law is changing.
181. 33 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1982). See supra note 63. The majority believed that off-
shore exploration on fixed platforms was not even suggestive of maritime commerce be-
cause Congress was of the opinion that maritime law would not apply to fixed platforms
unless a statute expressly so provided. The statute provided was the Lands Act. See
supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
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out an exception for those workers employed on artificial islands
that were outside the ."navigable waters" requirement of the
original LHWCA. 82 The fact that under the original LHWCA
offshore drilling was not suggestive of maritime activity,"' either
at the time of the enactment of the Lands Act or at the time of
the Rodrigue decision, is not dispositive of whether it is mari-
time activity under the 1972 amendments.8 "
The majority summarily addressed the characteristics of
Gray's employment, dismissing them as "nothing inherently
maritime."185 Consequently, the majority did not adequately dis-
cuss employment characteristics that are maritime within the
meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
This approach is consistent with LHWCA jurisprudence
that pre-dates the 1972 amendments because at that time there
was little litigation concerning whether an employee was en-
gaged in maritime employment for purposes of the LHWCA."'8
This was because the situs of the injury was almost always con-
clusive of coverage.18 7 Thus, prior to 1972, there was no well-
defined occupational status concept of maritime employment
within LHWCA jurisprudence.188 Unfortunately, the majority
has offered little toward defining maritime employment, and has
182. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The Lands Act changed the situa-
tion for workers on fixed platforms outside of state territorial waters. The Lands Act
made the LHWCA applicable to injuries occurring as the result of the exploration and
recovery of oil on the Outer Continental Shelf, notwithstanding the absence of "naviga-
ble waters" situs required by the original LHWCA.
183. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1426.
184. Id. at 1433-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1428.
Gray was a welder. His work had nothing to do with the loading or unloading
process, nor is there any indication that he was even employed in the maintenance
of equipment used in such tasks. Gray's welding work was far removed from tradi-
tional LHWCA activities, notwithstanding the fact that he unloaded his own gear
upon arriving at a platform by boat. He built and maintained pipelines and the
platforms themselves. There is nothing inherently maritime about those tasks.
Id.
186. Id. "The problem of which classes of workers were within the coverage of
[LHWCA] (apart from the classes expressly excluded) never, before the 1972 amend-
ments, accounted for any litigation." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 5, at 428.
187. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1435. This was because before 1972 workers who
were not seamen were considered maritime employees for purposes of the LHWCA if
they worked upon the navigable waters of the United States. For a discussion on pre-
amendment jurisprudence, see supra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
188. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1435.
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provided no guidance for lower tribunals charged with the deter-
mination of whether an employee is engaged in maritime em-
ployment for purposes of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).18s
The majority's approach is particularly anomalous when
viewed in light of other recent Supreme Court decisions. 90 Al-
though these cases do not involve LHWCA claims, they are
highly relevant because they have changed admiralty's tradi-
tional approach of exclusively defining the substance of an act
by its location. Specifically, these cases changed admiralty's
traditional reliance upon a tort's situs in determination of
whether admiralty subject matter jurisdiction exists.' The ma-
jority opinion in Herb's Welding harks back to this era of sub-
stantive locality.
Traditionally, determination of whether a tort was maritime
and thus falling within the admiralty subject matter jurisdiction
189. The majority's failure to adequately define the scope of § 902(3) maintains un-
desireable circumstances. For example, § 913 of the LHWCA provides a one year statute
of limitations for workers seeking recovery. 33 U.S.C. § 913 (1982). It is highly feasible
that a LHWCA claimant will be precluded from obtaining any remedy, if after filing his
action in accordance with state law, a determination is made that he is a LHWCA em-
ployee. This harks back to the anomalies and privations of the "maritime but local" era.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The statute of limitations for workmen's
compensation in Lousiania is one year. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1209 (West 1985).
The employer is placed in no less invidious position. First, failure to comply with the
LHWCA requirement of securing compensation constitutes a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not more than $1000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both. 33
U.S.C. § 938(a) (1982). Second, the injured employee of an employer who failed to secure
compensation has two remedies. He may still claim compensation which will be payable
out of a special fund if the uninsured employer fails to pay, 33 U.S.C. §§ 918, 944 (1982);
or he can sue directly for damages on account of the injury. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1982).
Therefore, an employer whose operations were arguably only within state waters can
find himself liable criminally and civilly if a court determines that his employee was a
LHWCA employee.
Gilmore and Black criticized § 902(3) because of the difficulties in determining its
scope. "The line between direct, physical 'participation' and indirect, non-physical 'par-
ticipation' will not be a whit easier to draw than the line between Jensen and 'maritime
but local'.... [I]f the Deputy Commissioners faithfully try to carry out the policy sug-
gested by the Committee Reports, they will have their work cut out for them." GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 5, at 430.
The Herb's Welding Court has maintained this ambiguity.
190. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982). Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
191. "[Tjhe discussion seemed to establish that some definite maritime flavor was
henceforward to be a prerequisite for all admiralty tort jurisdiction." GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 5, at 31 n.98.
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of the federal court depended upon the locality of the wrong.19
If the wrong occurred on water, the action was within admiralty
jurisdiction; if the wrong occurred on land, it was not.1"" The
end results of this system in an era of increasingly sophisticated
marine commerce were unsuitable to the needs of a uniform
maritime law.194 The matter finally reached the Supreme Court
in 1972 in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland.95
The Executive Jet Aviation Court forever changed the
method of determining admiralty subject matter jurisdiction in
tort opining that: "It is far more consistent with the history and
purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong bear a sig-
nificant relationship to traditional maritime activity."1 9" Tradi-
tional notions of subject matter jurisdiction were altered because
an examination of the status of the tort within the framework of
marine activity was also required.
It is not suggested that the test for invoking admiralty sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in tort should be equated with the test
triggering LHWCA status. In fact, the Supreme Court has spe-
192. "Every species of tort, however occuring, and whether on board a vessel or not,
if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." The Plymouth, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865).
193. Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 253.
194. Justice Stewart points out the historical shortcomings of locality in Executive
Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 253-67. "This locality test, of course, was established and grew
up in an era when it was difficult to conceive of a tortious occurrence on navigable waters
other than in connection with a waterborne vessel." Id. at 254.
195. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
196. Executive Jet Aviation, 409 U.S. at 268. In Executive Jet Aviation, the Court
was asked to determine whether admiralty jurisdiction existed when an aircraft, subse-
quent to take-off, crashed into nearby Lake Erie. The crash was due to the ingestion into
the engine of birds flying over the runway. Id. at 250. Plaintiffs brought a tort action
against the airport for failure to take reasonable care in assuring take-offs. Within this
unusual factual setting the tort could have arguably occurred upon ingestion (over land),
or at the navigable water crash site. The case demonstrates the difficulties involved in
strict application of locality.
The Court denied subject matter jurisdiction because the tort did not have a signifi-
cant relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 274.
In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982), the Court was asked to
determine if admiralty jurisdiction exists for tortious conduct between two pleasure ves-
sels. Notwithstanding arguments that limited the Executive Jet Aviation rationale to
commercial activities only, the Court held that all torts were maritime if they had a
significant relation to maritime activity. Id. at 677.
Foremost can be interpreted as the Court's attempt to make the scope of marine
activities governed by federal law as broad as possible.
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cifically refused to do so.197 However, Executive Jet Aviation is
highly relevant because, within the sphere of admiralty jurispru-
dence, the focal inquiry has shifted from strict locality to a more
substantive approach at defining whether or not something is
within admiralty. This is an inquiry that the majority in Herb's
Welding failed to undertake because it analyzed the substance
of Gray's employment almost exclusively in terms of its locality.
Thus, the majority's analysis disregards the impact of Executive
Jet Aviation and its progeny and is therefore in derogation of
evolving maritime law.198
B. Interpretation of the Legislative Intent of Section 902(3)
The majority's interpretation of the legislative intent of 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) focused on only those activities of longshoring
that have always been regarded as traditional, that is, the load-
ing and discharging of conventional dry cargo vessels. 9 9 While
its analysis of those possessing the requisite status within this
traditional scenario was correct, 00 it failed to recognize that
Congress amended the LHWCA to accommodate the rapidly
changing maritime industry.20' For example, changes in long-
197. In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River As-
socs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983), respondent argued that the LHWCA is premised upon admi-
ralty jurisdiction, which requires a connection between an employee and traditional mar-
itime activity. Id. The Court disagreed, opining that the LHWCA and the statute
defining admiralty subject matter jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331(1)) are two different
statutes "each with different legislative histories and jurisprudential interpretations over
the decade." Id. at 320, n.29 [citing Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d
1034, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) (for effect of Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act of 1980 on Boudreaux, see Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 9 (1980))].
198. The dissent looked at other attributes of Gray's employment, irrespective of its
situs, that might be indicative of maritime status. For example, the dissent argued that
workers on platforms were exposed on a daily basis to hazards associated with maritime
employment, Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1432; that the occupation was regulated in
part by the Coast Guard, an agency traditionally charged with regulation of maritime
activities. Id. at 1435; and that there is little to distinguish the job of a worker on a
fixed rig from his floating rig counterpart. Id. at 1438. See supra notes 150-73 and ac-
companying text.
199. These vessels are traditional carriers of cargos in diverse packaging arrange-
ments. While extant, these vessels are few in number compared to more sophisticated
modes of sea transportation. See generally R. MUNRO-SMITH, MERCHANT SHIP TYPES 64-
100 (1975). See infra notes 202-03.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 127-39.
201. "It is also to be noted that-with the advent of modern cargo-handling tech-
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shoring activities have been brought about by the advent of
LASH 20 2  transport and containerization.20 3  These changes,
among others, have permanently altered traditional longshoring
activities. Much of the longshoring previously done aboard ves-
sels is now performed elsewhere.20 Congress understood the lim-
itation of statutory language and was unwilling to define explic-
itly all of the new marine workers covered by 33 U.S.C. §
902(3).205 Congress' recognition of the rapidly changing marine
industry implies that it never meant for 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) to be
narrowly construed and analyzed in the light of traditional long-
shoring only.2 6
The rapid change in traditional longshoring activities is no-
where more apparent than in the loading and discharging of oil
tankers. Due mostly to economies of scale, large tank ships
designed to carry petroleum products are built so large that they
are unable to dock within the relative safety of a port.20 In-
stead, the tankers load and discharge their multi-million gallon
cargos through Single Point Mooring Buoys [hereinafter cited as
SPM] located offshore, in the deep water necessary to accommo-
date these superships. 0 a The oil cargo is frequently pumped to
niques, such as containerization and the use of LASH-type vessels, more of the long-
shoreman's work is performed on land than heretofore." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong.
2d Sess. 4698, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4707-08.
A LASH vessel (Lighter Aboard Ship) is a barge carrying ship that normally does
not dock in order to load or discharge cargo. Barges are towed to the LASH located
outside of the port where they are loaded aboard the vessel for sea transportation. C.
SAUERBIER & R. MEURN, MARINE CARGO OPERATIONS 627-29 (2d ed. 1985).
Container ships carry the trailers normally associated with trucks. The vessel will
load several thousand containers for sea transportation. Id. at 20-24.
The type of work done by today's longshoreman is a far cry from his traditional dry
cargo ship counterpart. Id.
202. See supra note 201.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. "The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations . 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982).
It is arguable that notwithstanding Gray's artificial island situs, under the canon of
ejusdem generis, Gray's occupation is similar to those explicitly mentioned in 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(3). See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 201.
207. See generally A. MARKS, ELEMENTS OF OIL-TANKER TRANSPORTATION (1982).
208. The L.O.O.P. (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port) system is an example of a SPM.
The buoy is located in 114 feet of water, accommodating tankers carrying up to 700,000
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the SPM for loading aboard or discharging from ships via a se-
ries of pipes and valves controlled and maintained from the
fixed platform. Additionally, large fleets of supply vessels service
the platforms by discharging their cargos of drilling mud, ce-
ment, machinery, and supplies onto the platforms, so that the
platforms can continue their marine operations. The drilling
mud is pumped onto the platform through a pipe maintained by
platform workers. 09
These activities represent a part of the new era in longshor-
ing. Maintenance of these platforms is no less connected to mar-
itime commerce than those activities traditionally covered. The
status of these employees is no different from that of a
checker,210 a sewage plant construction worker,211 or a pierside
carpenter, 12 all of whom were held covered under 33 U.S.C. §
902(3). It is arguable that a platform welder's employment has a
more intimate connection to maritime commerce because the
flow of petroleum-based cargo stops if these pipelines are not
maintained. Congress recognized the fact that the marine indus-
try is rapidly changing and therefore Congress established 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) to accommodate those workers not explicitly
covered within the text of the LHWCA.1 3 The majority's inter-
pretation of the history of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) limits LHWCA
coverage to include longshoring activities which pre-date these
changes. Therefore, the majority's reading of 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)
is unduly restrictive.
C. The Realistically Significant Relationship Test
The Court should have adjudged Gray's status within the
framework of the Fifth Circuit's "realistically significant rela-
tionship to traditional maritime activities ' 214 test used in a long
tons of oil and up to 1400 feet in length. Id. at 168.
209. The drilling mud discharged onto the platforms is essential for oil exploration.
The mud is forced down through the drill bit and acts as a lubricant. P. SWAN, OCEAN OIL
AND GAs DRILLING AND THE LAW 11 (1979).
210. Northeast Marine Terminal v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
211..Perini, 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
212. Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1980). For additional
cases see infra note 215.
213. See 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). See statutes cited supra note 6.
214. Herb's Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1983).
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series of LHWCA cases which determined employee status
under 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).2" s The majority did not apply this test
because it relied on Director, Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs v. Perini North River Associates which had rejected
this test as a means of determining LHWCA status.216 However,
Perini involved a worker injured upon the water. The Court de-
termined that it was never intended that an employee injured
upon the navigable waters in the course of his employment pos-
sess a direct or substantial relation to navigation or commerce in
order to be covered. 217
Perini's analysis must be evaluated within its factual set-
ting. In Perini, claimant's employment upon the navigable wa-
ters made him one of a group of workers who were granted al-
most automatic coverage under the pre-amendment LHWCA 2 18
"Congress was concerned with injuries on land, and assumed
that injuries occurring on the actual navigable waters were cov-
ered and would remain covered. '21 9 Therefore, the Perini Court
rejected the proposition that workers injured upon the water
had to possess a 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) status that included a signifi-
cant relationship to traditional maritime activity.2 20 The Court
concluded that all those employees covered before the 1972
amendments (which included all employees on navigable waters)
would be automatically covered under the amended LHWCA 2 1
215. The Fifth Circuit has used this test in: Jenkens v. McDermott, 734 F.2d 229,
233 (5th Cir. 1984) (worker injured while constructing an offshore drilling platform is
engaged in maritime employment); Thornton v. Brown & Root, 707 F.2d 149, 152 (5th
Cir. 1983) (workers injured while constructing offshore platform on land engaged in mar-
itime employment); Mississippi Coast Marine v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir.
1981) (carpenter injured while working on a 30 foot pleasure boat engaged in maritime
employment); Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1980) (carpenter
building a pier engaged in maritime employment); Odom Constr. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor,
622 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1980) (workers injured while moving concrete blocks for mooring
barges are engaged in maritime employment).
The Ninth Circuit used this test in denying status to a "pondman" injured while
sorting and feeding logs into a lumber mill. Weyerhaeuser v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 961
(9th Cir. 1975).
216. 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 319.
220. Id. at 325.
221. Id. The specific question in Perini was whether a worker who was injured while
performing his job upon navigable waters, and who would have been covered by the
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However, Perini does not prohibit the use of the "significant re-
lationship" test for a worker employed on real or artificial land.
Therefore, notwithstanding Perini, this test is suggested for ana-
lyzing the substantive characteristics of occupations on these si-
tus and its continued rejection for water-based workers.2 2
This test is appropriate for several reasons. First, it provides
flexible perimeters around which an effective body of LHWCA
jurisprudence can develop. Water-based workers would enjoy a
presumption that their employment is maritime. 223 This con-
forms to the realization that the "nature of a particular job is
defined in part by its location. 22 4 An employee on real or artifi-
cial land would have to establish that his employment had a sig-
nificant relationship to maritime activities to be considered en-
gaged in maritime employment. Lower tribunals charged with
the administration of LHWCA claims can look to the developing
jurisprudence for the guidance that is presently missing.22 5
This will also facilitate the legislature's intention to accom-
modate new types of workers engaged in a changing maritime
environment.2 6 Whether employment is maritime requires an
inquiry into the substantive characteristics of the employment
including, but not limited to, whether it occurred on a covered
situs.
Finally, this test is consistent with evolving maritime law
evidenced by Executive Jet Aviation because it recognizes the
LHWCA before 1972, had to demonstrate a relation to navigation or commerce under
the 1972 amendments. The Court found no such requirement. Id. at 315. The require-
ment of a relationship to navigation or commerce would have eliminated many workers
from coverage who prior to 1972 were covered because of their locality alone. "[W]e are
unable to find [any congressional intent] to withdraw coverage [of the LHWCA] from
employees injured on navigable waters in the course of their employment, as that cover-
age existed before the 1972 amendments." Id.
222. An employee working on a water-based situs would not have to demonstrate a
relationship that was significant. His occupation would be presumed to be maritime em-
ployment, subject to rebuttal. "[A] major factor in the determination of 'maritime em-
ployment' is whether the members of an occupation are 'required to perform their em-
ployment duties upon navigable waters'." Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 143 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing Perini, 459 U.S. at 323-24).
223. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
224. Herb's Welding, 105 S. Ct. at 1428.
225. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
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existing, but reduced, role of situs within the law of admiralty.227
It considers location upon water as only one attribute of marine
status. However, under this approach the impact of situs upon
maritime status does not preclude an analysis of other occupa-
tional characteristics determinative of whether an employee is
engaged in maritime employment. This is an analysis the major-
ity in Herb's Welding failed to undertake.2 8
V. Conclusion
Although location partially defines the substance of an oc-
cupation, § 902(3) of the LHWCA and Executive Jet Aviation229
evidence a departure from occupational analysis in terms of
strict locality.2 30 Today, whether an activity is within admiralty
law requires a more substantive analysis.2 31
The majority in Herb's Welding did not recognize this de-
parture. Instead, it overemphasized the impact of the situs of
Gray's injury in determining that he was not engaged in mari-
time employment,2 3 2 an analysis similar to pre-amendment juris-
prudence that interpreted situs as being virtually conclusive of
LHWCA coverage.133 Consequently, the Court has failed to pro-
vide guidance for lower tribunals charged with the determina-
tion of who is a maritime employee for purposes of 33 U.S.C. §
902(3).234
The majority's interpretation of the legislative intent of 33
U.S.C. § 902(3) is unduly restrictive because it does not recog-
nize Congress' desire to accommodate the rapidly changing mar-
itime industry23 5 Under a less restrictive analysis, a platform
227. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
228. No suggestion is made here that the Court should have affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's determination that Gray was engaged in maritime employment. Herb's Welding v.
Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1983). However, the majority should have concentrated
its inquiry into the substance of Gray's employment. The "significant relationship" test
is an appropriate means of analyzing its substance. See supra notes 222-27 and accompa-
nying text.
229. Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
230. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
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welder's duties are more connected to longshoring activities than
are the duties of some shoreside employees who are traditionally
covered under the LHWCA, as amended. 36
The "significant relationship to traditional maritime activi-
ties" test is suggested for determining the scope of 33 U.S.C. §
902(3) for workers employed on real or artificial land.2 37 A
water-based employee will enjoy the presumption that his em-
ployment is maritime.2 38 Therefore, a water-based employee will
not have to demonstrate a relationship that is significant. How-
ever, his employment must still be substantively maritime. 23 9
This test is advantageous because it recognizes the extant,
but depreciated role of situs in accordance with evolving mari-
time jurisprudence.2 40 The test also conforms to Congress' desire
to have the LHWCA accommodate the rapidly changing mari-
time industry.2 41 The test facilitates this accommodation be-
cause it will establish within flexible perimeters the LHWCA ju-
risprudence that is necessary to guide lower tribunals charged
with the administration of LHWCA claims.242
Jeffrey A. Weiss
236. See text accompanying supra notes 207-13.
237. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 223-24 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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